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INDEX NO. 28596/2016ENYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/22/2016SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Index No.:COUNTY OF BRONX Date Purchased:wen eee ene XxY. N. an infant by her mother and natural guardian, SUMMONSKELLY HAMMOND, and KELLY HAMMOND,Individually, Plaintiffs designate BronxCounty as the place of trial.Plaintiffs,The basis of venue is:-against- Plaintiffs' residenceSOUTH BRONX CLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL III, Plaintiffs reside at:2114 Aqueduct AvenueDefendant. Bronx, New York 10453To the above named Defendants:You are hereby summoned to answer the complaint in this action, and to serve a copyof your answer, or, if the complaint is not served with this summons, to serve a notice ofappearance on the plaintiffs attorneys within twenty days after the service of this summons,exclusive of the day of service, where service is made by delivery upon you personally withinthe state, or, within 30 days after completion of service where service is made in any othermanner. In case of your failure to appear or answer, judgment will be taken against you bydefault for the relief demanded in the complaint.Dated: New York, New YorkDecember 22, 2016We LLAR ; SCHNEIDER[WARTZ GOLDSTONE & CAMPISI, LLPAttorneys for PlaintiffsY. N. an infant by her mother and naturalguardian, KELLY HAMMOND, and KELLYHAMMOND, Individually90 Broad Street, Suite 403New York, New York 10004(212) 962-2800Our File No.: 4836TO:SOUTH BRONX CLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL HI3490 Third AvenueBronx, New York 10456lof 7SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORKCOUNTY OF BRONXi x Index No.:Y.N. an infant by her mother and natural guardian, Date Purchased:KELLY HAMMOND, and KELLY HAMMOND,tndividually VERIFIED COMPLAINTPlaintiffs,-against-SOUTH BRONX CLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL III,Defendant.Plaintiffs, by their attorneys SCHWARTZ GOLDSTONE & CAMPISI, LLP,complaining of the Defendant, respectfully allege, upon information and belief, as follows:AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTIONON BEHALF OF Y.N.1. That, at all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff KELLY HAMMOND was and stillis the mother and natural guardian of Y.N., an infant under the age of 14 years, and both were,and still are, residents of the County of the Bronx, State of New York.2. That this action falls within one or more of the exceptions as set forth in CPLR§1602.3. That, at all times herein mentioned, the Defendant SOUTH BRONXCLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL III was, and still is, a domestic corporation dulyorganized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York.2 0f 74, That, at all times herein mentioned, the Defendant SOUTH BRONXCLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL I was, and still is, a foreign corporation duly authorizedto do business in the State of New York.5. That, at all times herein mentioned, the Defendant SOUTH BRONXCLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL III was, and still is, a not for profit corporation and/orentity duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York.6. That, at all times herein mentioned, the Defendant SOUTH BRONXCLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL III was, and still is, a domestic education corporationduly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York.7. That, at all times herein mentioned, the Defendant SOUTH BRONXCLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL III was, and still is, a public school, organized, charteredand existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York.8. That, at all times herein mentioned, the Defendant SOUTH BRONXCLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL III was, and still is, a private school, organized, charteredand existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York.9. That, at all times herein mentioned, the Defendant SOUTH BRONXCLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL III, maintained a principal office and/or place of businessin the County of the Bronx, State of New York.10. That, at all times herein mentioned, the Defendant SOUTH BRONXCLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL ITI was, and still is, a resident of the State of New York.11. That, at all times herein mentioned, the Defendant SOUTH BRONXCLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL III owned the premises, including appurtenances andfixtures thereto, located at 3490 Third Avenue, in the County of the Bronx, State of New York.3 0f 712. That, at all times herein mentioned, the Defendant SOUTH BRONXCLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL III operated the aforesaid premises.13. That, at all times herein mentioned, the Defendant SOUTH BRONXCLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL III managed the aforesaid premises.14. That, at all times herein mentioned, the Defendant SOUTH BRONXCLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL III controlled the aforesaid premises.15. That, at all times herein mentioned, the Defendant SOUTH BRONXCLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL III operated the aforesaid premises.16. That, at all times herein mentioned, the Defendant SOUTH BRONXCLASSICAL CHARTER SCHOOL III was responsible to maintain the aforesaid premises ina reasonably safe condition.17. On September 11, 2015, Infant Plaintiff Y.N. was lawfully on the aforesaidpremises.18. On September 11, 2015, Infant Plaintiff Y.N. was a student at the aforesaidpremises.19. On September 11, 2015, while Infant Plaintiff Y.N. was a student at the aforesaidpremises, the Defendant was acting in loco parentis at the aforementioned premises.20. On September 11, 2015, Infant Plaintiff Y.N. was a student at the aforesaidpremises, and was under the supervision, custody and control of the Defendant.21. On September 11, 2015, while Infant Plaintiff Y.N. was lawfully about theaforesaid premises she was caused to slip and fall due to an unsafe and unreasonably dangerouscondition at the aforesaid premises, including water, liter and garbage on the bathroom floor.4o0f 722. That the above mentioned occurrence, and the results thereof, were caused by thenegligence of the Defendant and/or Defendant’s agents, servants, employees and/or licensees inthe ownership, operation, management, supervision, maintenance and control of the aforesaidpremises, and in the supervision, custody and control of the Infant Plaintiff.23. That no negligence on the part of the Infant Plaintiff contributed to the occurrencealleged herein in any manner whatsoever.24, That, by reason of the foregoing, Infant Plaintiff Y.N. was caused to sustaininjuries and otherwise damaged.425. at, as a result of the foregoing, Infant Plaintiff Y.N. was damaged in an amountthat exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts that would otherwise have jurisdiction.AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTIONON BEHALF OF KELLY HAMMOND26. That, at all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff KELLY HAMMOND repeats,reiterates and re-alleges each and every allegation contained herein as though set forth at lengthherein.27. That, at all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff KELLY HAMMOND was themother of the Infant Plaintiff Y.N. and as such was entitled to the services of her child Y.N.28. That, at all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff KELLY HAMMOND was themother of the infant Plaintiff Y.N. and as such expended sums of money for her medical care andwill continue to do so in the future.29. That, by reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff KELLY HAMMOND was deprived ofthe services of the Infant Plaintiff Y.N. and shall forever be deprived of services, and has andwill continue to expend sums of money for his medical care.5 of 730. That, by reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff KELLY HAMMOND was damaged inan amount that exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts that would otherwise havejurisdiction.WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against the Defendant on the First andSecond Causes of Action in an amount to be determined upon the trial of this action, togetherwith the costs and disbursem*nts of this action.Dated: New York, New YorkDecember 22, 2016Yours ete. ’ARYEH B. SCHNEIDERSCHWARTZ GOLDSTONE & CAMPISI, LLPAttorneys for PlaintiffsY.N. an infant by her mother and naturalguardian, KELLY HAMMOND, and KELLYHAMMOND, Individually90 Broad Street, Suite 403New York, New York 10004(212) 962-2800Our File No.: 48366 of 7ATTORNEY'S VERIFICATIONARYEH B. SCHNEIDER, an attorney duly admitted to practice before the Courts of theState of New York, affirms the following to be true under the penalties of perjury:Tam an attorney at SCHWARTZ GOLDSTONE & CAMPISI, LLP, attorneys ofrecord for Plaintiffs, Y. N. an infant by her mother and natural guardian, KELLYHAMMOND, and KELLY HAMMOND, Individually.I have read the annexed COMPLAINT and know the contents thereof, and the same aretrue to my knowledge, except those matters therein which are stated to be alleged uponinformation and belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true. My belief, as to thosematters therein not stated upon knowledge, is based upon facts, records, and other pertinentinformation contained in my files.This verification is made by me because Plaintiffs do not reside in the county wherein Imaintain my offices.DATED: New York, New YorkDecember 22, 2016ABYEH B. SCHNEIDER7 of 7
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Aug 27, 2024 |BC585574
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MONCINO HADNOT-BROWN VS GLAM HOUSE LOS ANGELES
Aug 26, 2024 |24STCV00245
Case Number: 24STCV00245 Hearing Date: August 26, 2024 Dept: 28 On August 1, 2024, the Court granted Midvale Indemnity Company (Midvale) leave to intervene on behalf of Defendant Happy Home Goods LLC dba Glam House (erroneously sued and served as Glam House Los Angeles) based on the stipulation between Midvale and Plaintiff Moncino Hadnot-Brown. Therefore, Midvales motion for leave to intervene, set to be heard on August 26, 2024, is moot.
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